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Saving Mobutu: Zaire, the West, and the  
Inter-African Force, 1978–1979* 
 
By Nathaniel K. Powell 
 
In June 1978, nearly 2,500 soldiers from Morocco, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, 
and Togo deployed to Zaire on behalf of the country’s dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. 
This Inter-African Force (IAF) represented the first time that African states had 
collaborated on a peacekeeping mission outside the auspices of the United 
Nations. 1  The IAF, financed and supported by core Western bloc countries, 
particularly France and the United States, came as a response to two invasions, in 
1977 and 1978, of the southern Zairian province of Shaba by rebels known as the 
“Katangan Gendarmes,” or Tigres, based in Northern Angola. 
The Shaba invasions seriously threatened the survival of Mobutu’s regime. In 
both instances, foreign military interventions saved Mobutu and forced the rebels 
back across the border. In 1977, this help came principally in the form of Moroccan 
troops, with France both organizing the operation and providing logistical support. 
The following year, a French airborne assault stopped the invaders under the pretext 
of protecting the European expatriate population in Kolwezi, Shaba’s most important 
mining center.  
The two invasions, combined with Mobutu’s highly corrupt personalized rule and 
appalling economic conditions, brought Zaire to the edge of collapse. The country’s 
economy lay in ruins and its army was broken. The mostly-European expatriate 
community, necessary for the proper functioning of Shaba’s mining operations, 
threatened to flee in droves. Meanwhile, the Tigres across the border seemed 
poised to mount a third attack. To make matters worse, Mobutu’s Western allies 
feared that the Tigres were communist proxies and that their invasions represented 
a concerted Soviet-Cuban effort to destabilize Central Africa.  
Thus, in order to stabilize the situation and prevent a renewed invasion, Western 
bloc states, led by France, oversaw a major international effort to secure and rebuild 
Mobutu’s regime. This included an attempt to use IMF loans and other forms of 
financial assistance as leverage to obtain both significant economic reforms and a 
partial expatriate takeover of the major organs of Zaire’s economy. This effort also 
involved assistance in retraining Zaire’s ineffective military, as well as regional 
                                            
* The author would like to thank Miles Larmer and Erik Kennes for generously sharing British 
and Belgian archival material. A significantly shorter and more narrowly focused version of this paper 
appeared in French as: Nathaniel Kinsey Powell, “La France, les Etats-Unis et la Force interafricaine 
au Zaïre (1978–1979),” Relations internationales 150 (2012), 71–83. 
1 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 162. 
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moves to find a diplomatic solution to neutralize the country’s immediate external 
threats. Meanwhile, Zaire’s international backers hoped that the IAF would buy time 
for Mobutu’s regime to get back on its feet.  
This paper examines international efforts in the aftermath of the Shaba invasions 
aimed at safeguarding Mobutu’s position. In particular, it looks at how the politics of 
Zaire’s stabilization revealed divergent priorities among Western policymakers. The 
latter were mainly motivated by fears of perceived communist expansion in Africa. 
Nevertheless, they often disagreed on both the means and level of commitment 
required to contain it. This paper also addresses the role played by Mobutu and 
other African leaders and elites in seeking to manage, and even undermine, broader 
Western security goals. 
After briefly outlining the Shaba crises, this paper will first examine Western 
efforts to stabilize Mobutu’s regime, particularly through a combination of pressure 
for economic reforms and financial assistance from the IMF. It will show how this 
assistance benefited Mobutu in more ways than one as he enriched himself from the 
aid flows and exploited his perceived indispensability to his donors, both public and 
private. Next, the paper will examine parallel Western efforts, led by France, to 
organize, fund, and assist the deployment of the IAF along Zaire’s southern frontier 
to prevent a third Shaba invasion. The IAF played a key role in Western, particularly 
French and American, strategy aimed at buying time for Mobutu as other assistance 
took effect. The paper will describe how tensions within the IAF, increasing demands 
by troop-contributing countries, and local conditions, limited the extent to which this 
force could sustainably further Western policy goals.  
Finally, this paper will look at the wider African political dimension as French and 
deeper Western involvement in Zaire triggered significant diplomatic reactions from 
numerous “moderate” and “progressive” countries on the continent. Ultimately this 
served to decisively undermine broader French security aims in Africa. Taken 
together, the underlying argument of this paper is that the strategies and policies of 
Western bloc actors, particularly France, were severely constrained by local and 
regional realities. Western proxies in Africa were anything but that. They could play 
important roles in determining the extent of success or failure of the policies of their 
Western backers, and Mobutu played this game better than most. 
The Shaba Crises 
The Shaba invasions were launched by the “Katangan Gendarmes,” or Tigres. This 
group, led by former Katangan police chief Nathanaël Mbumba, called itself the 
Front de libération nationale du Congo (FLNC). As the Katanga reference implies, 
the group represented the political and military descendants of Moïse Tshombe’s 
secessionist Katangan regime who had fled to Angola in the early and mid-1960s. 
Initially the FLNC allied itself with the Portuguese during the Angolan independence 
war. Starting in 1975, as the Portuguese withdrew from Angola, the group found new 
allies in the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In a vicious, 
see-saw military campaign preceding and following Angola’s independence on 
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November 11, 1975, the Marxist MPLA emerged victorious thanks to a substantial 
Cuban military intervention, bolstered by significant Soviet support.  
For Mbumba and the FLNC, this represented a favorable occasion with which to 
make themselves useful to the MPLA by countering the Zairian backed National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which the MPLA had defeated in 1975–
1976. Based in Northern Angola, along Angola’s border with Zaire’s Shaba province 
(formerly, and now again named Katanga), the FLNC constituted a significant threat 
to Mobutu’s security.2 
This threat arose for several reasons. As the political descendants of the 
Katangan secessionist forces, the presence of these “Katangan Gendarmes” near 
the border again raised the ugly specter of territorial fragmentation and secession. 
Mobutu’s relationship with this faraway province had always been fraught with 
difficulties. Its large copper, cobalt, and tin deposits, combined with its advanced 
mining infrastructure, made it Zaire’s richest province, producing 60 percent of the 
country’s foreign exchange earnings. It was thus imperative that Shaba remain 
under Mobutu’s control.3  
Nonetheless, the aftereffects of the province’s secession attempt had not 
entirely subsided. In the interceding decade and a half between the secession and 
the Shaba crises, Mobutu had consistently alienated Shaba’s population through 
military exactions, discrimination, and political marginalization. 4  This dangerous 
situation evolved into a potential powder keg, which the FLNC seemed ready to light 
at any moment. As André Ross, France’s ambassador to Zaire at the time, noted, 
“Shaba is [Zaire’s] weak point: without Shaba, Zaire loses most of its current 
resources, with Shaba, it contains an explosive ferment.”5 
The first invasion of the Tigres, launched from Angolan territory, began in early 
March 1977. Apart from a few small engagements the Zairian Army, the Forces 
armées zaïroises (FAZ), fled its positions without a fight. Despite a slow advance, 
within a month, the Katangans controlled a large swathe of Shaba and threatened to 
move eastwards to Kolwezi, the province’s mining center. Kolwezi was also home to 
some 3,000 expatriate workers and their families, mostly working for Zaire’s 
                                            
2 For an overview of the history of the Gendarmes, see Miles Larmer, "Local Conflicts in a 
Transnational War: The Katangese Gendarmes and the Shaba Wars of 1977–78," Cold War History 
13, 1 (2013), 89–108. 
3 Jimmy Carter Library (henceforth JCL), Atlanta, White House Central File, Box CO-67: Zaire, 
Folder: (CO 177 Executive 1/20/77-1/20/81), Document (number unknown), Memorandum from Tom 
Thornton to David Aaron, “O’Neil Briefing,” Zaire talking points, 5.6.1978, p. 2. 
4 French Foreign Ministry Archives (henceforth MAE), Nantes, Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 45, 
Lubumbashi Consulat, Dossier 1978, “Situation au Shaba à la veille de l’attaque de Kolwezi,” 
18.05.1978, p. 8–11. 
5  MAE Nantes, Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 45, Lubumbashi Consulat, Dossier 1978, 
Dépêche d’actualité from Ross to la Direction des affaires africaines et malgaches, “Le Zaïre après 
Kolwezi,” 02.06.1978, p. 5. N.B. Unless noted otherwise, all translations from French are the author’s. 
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parastatal mining conglomerate, the Générale des Carrières et des Mines 
(Gécamines) which dominated Shaba’s economy. A worried Mobutu asked for 
assistance from his African and Western allies.  
American officials in the newly inaugurated administration of President Jimmy 
Carter hesitated about whether, and how, to support the Zairian leader’s embattled 
regime. Officials close to Carter did feel that the invasion posed a serious threat to 
Mobutu, and that his overthrow could have catastrophic consequences in the region. 
In the assessment of Admiral Stansfield Turner, the newly-appointed director of the 
CIA, Mobutu’s downfall “could not fail to be perceived as a major ‘loss’ for the US in 
Africa […] if not [an] actual ‘gain’ for the USSR, Cuba, and the radical socialist club 
in Africa.”6  
Deliberations of Carter’s National Security Council (NSC) in mid-March 
highlighted the quandary that American policymakers felt. The NSC concluded that:  
The dilemma is a simple and traditional one. How far do we go to 
support a regime that is very imperfect but is friendly to us, with which 
we have been deeply involved, and which is seen to be our ‘ally’? To 
what extent is our credibility at stake? Will our help have any real 
chance of success in making the FAZ a capable instrument?7 
Ambiguous views on a commitment to Mobutu’s survival would remain a constant 
feature of American policymaking throughout the Carter administration. Ultimately, 
Carter consented to provide some 15 million dollars of “non-lethal” military 
assistance.8 The early Carter administration’s public emphasis on human rights goes 
a long way in explaining the tepid nature of US support to Mobutu during this crisis. 
The US Congress also had concerns about Mobutu’s human rights record. Shortly 
after the first Shaba crisis, and despite Mobutu’s relative fragility, these 
considerations led it to cut the ceiling for its annual security assistance to Zaire in 
half, from 20 million dollars in 1977 to 10 million for 1978.9  
French policymakers had far fewer qualms about supporting Mobutu’s regime. 
Although not a former French colony, Zaire grew substantially in importance to 
France during the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974–1981)10 For some 
                                            
6  CIA CREST Database Document NLC-17-77-8-5-6, “Implications of the Collapse of the 
Government of Zaire,” 17.03.1977, p.2. 
7 JCL, CREST Database Document NLC-12-61-1-8-2, Memorandum for the File from Thomas P. 
Thornton, “Zaire Situation,” 16.03.1977, p. 1. 
8 JCL, White House Central File, Box CO-67: Zaire, Folder: (CO 177 Confidential 1/20/77–
1/20/81), Document (number unknown), Memorandum from Christine Dodson to Denis Clift, “Vice 
President Mondale’s Meeting with Zairian Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation Nguza Karl-I-Bond,” 26.07.1977, p. 2. 
9 Ibid.  
10 For a detailed evaluation of the drivers of French policy in Zaire, see Nathaniel K. Powell, 
“The Cuba of the West? France’s Cold War in Zaire,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 18, 2 (2016). 
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observers, French interest derived principally from economic motives.11 Undoubtedly, 
potentially lucrative investment possibilities attracted serious French attention. For 
instance, Giscard had personally helped negotiate an important contract between 
Mobutu and Thomson-CSF, a major French telecommunications company. The 
French parastatal, the Bureau de recherches géologiques et minières, one of the 
largest mining concerns then operating in Africa, also owned important shares in 
several mining consortia in Shaba province. Various French private investments in 
the construction industry complemented this presence. By the mid-1970s, France 
also imported a third of its copper supply from Zaire.12 Additionally, a number of 
French companies investing in Zaire and elsewhere in Africa had close ties to the 
French political elite.13 Most notably, the head of Thomson-CSF was none other 
than Giscard’s cousin, Philippe Giscard d’Estaing. 
Nonetheless, while potentially lucrative investment possibilities certainly played 
a background role in French interest in the Zaire, economic interests cannot explain 
the high level of political commitment to Mobutu’s survival. Indeed, French 
investments in Zaire only totaled some 20 million dollars by 1977. The French 
economic presence was paltry compared to the 800 million dollars of Belgian 
investment and 200 million dollars of American investment.14 Furthermore, French 
and Belgian mining elites surprised French intelligence officials by their complete 
unconcern about the prospect of Mobutu’s overthrow and a communist Zaire, given 
that buyers dominated the international mineral markets.15 Even Zairian cobalt, an 
important strategic mineral, had little importance to French industry, whereas it 
supplied some 70 percent of American needs.16   
Instead of clear-cut economic motives, the most important impulse for French 
involvement lay in Cold War-inspired considerations. Thousands of Cuban troops in 
neighbouring Angola and the presence of Soviet advisors in support of the MPLA 
regime there fed presumptions that the Katangan invasions represented an effort to 
                                            
11 See Theodore Trefon, French Policy Toward Zaire During the Giscard D'Estaing Presidency 
(Brussels: Centre d'étude et de documentation africaines, 1989); and Jean-Claude Willame, “La 
France au Zaïre: Le grand ‘safari technologique’” in François Maspero, ed., La France contre l'Afrique 
(Paris: F. Maspero, 1981). 
12 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 27, 27/1, Note pour le cabinet du 
ministre, “A/S: Présence économique française dans le Shaba,” 23.03.1977, pp. 1–2. 
13 Trefon, French Policy, 84–85. 
14 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 21, 21/3, Note “A/S: Zaïre,” 27.12.1978, 
p. 3. 
15 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 27, 27/2, Fiche du Groupe Permanent 
d’Evaluation de Situations du Secrétariat General de la Défense Nationale, No. 21/CER/B/CD, 
“Evolution de la situation au Zaïre,” 07.04.1977, Annexe. 
16 France imported most of its cobalt from Morocco. See Galen Spencer Hull, “The French 
Connection in Africa: Zaire and South Africa,” Journal of Southern African Studies 5, 2 (1979), 225. 
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expand the influence of communism in Africa by destabilizing Zaire. French officials 
in the Foreign Ministry felt strongly that the Soviets viewed Zaire as a “perfect target” 
whose destabilization would, “contribute to undermining the confidence of moderate 
African countries with respect to Western protection, and test the American will to 
retaliate.”17 If successful, this would also deal a severe blow to French prestige and 
credibility on the continent, particularly with its francophone client states. 
In contrast, in the first months of the Carter administration, détente with the 
Soviet Union had not yet found itself “buried under the sands of the Ogaden.”18 The 
administration wanted to avoid making Shaba I into a Cold War issue.19 In the first 
weeks of the war, Carter administration officials even put pressure on Mobutu to 
lower the tone of his accusations against the Soviets and Cubans. 20  These 
admonitions had little effect as Mobutu’s verbal attacks against the Eastern bloc 
increased in intensity as the days went by and as the FAZ continued its retreat.  
Mobutu continually cited FAZ radio intercepts of Spanish and Portuguese 
speakers communicating with the attacking forces. American Ambassador Walter 
Cutler viewed this as an attempt by Mobutu to force the hand of his western backers 
into increasing their support. He felt that Mobutu’s effort “carries obvious risks […] in 
that a tepid or no response from us could be viewed by his enemies and domestic 
opponents alike as a signal that the West will not in fact back up his regime. But 
given Zaire’s vulnerable position and Mobutu’s real uncertainty as to whether he can 
count on any further help from us, he probably feels it is a risk worth taking.”21 
Mobutu’s efforts to pin the invasion on the Cubans and Soviets may not have 
worked on the Americans, but it did help to push the French into thinking about 
broader options. 
Thus, in March and early April 1977 as the Katangans advanced, and despite 
American scepticism and relative Belgian disinterest (Brussels sent Mobutu a C-130 
with some spare ammunition), 22  French military officials, diplomats, and 
policymakers both in Kinshasa and in Paris, began to push for some kind of 
                                            
17 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 27, 27/2, Note pour le cabinet du 
ministre, “A/s. Situation au Zaïre,” 18.03.1977, p. 3. 
18 For this phrase, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National 
Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 189. 
19 JCL, National Security Affairs, 15, Box 2 (Brzezinski Office File Country Chron, Africa: 1-5/78 
through Angola: 1979–1980), Folder: (Africa 10–12/1978), Document 3, Memorandum from Thomas 
Thornton to David Aaron, “African Chiefs of Mission Panel,” 10.10.1978. 
20 JCL, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material 12, Box 61 (General Odom File: Zaire 3/77 
through Zaire 5-8/78), Folder: (Zaire, 3/77), Document 30, Telegram from Cutler to Vance, forwarded 
to Brzezinski, “Shaba Invasions: Consultations with Mobutu,” 23.03.1977. 
21 Ibid. 
22 MAE Nantes, Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 49, “Guerre du Shaba,” “Opérations du Shaba: 
Déroulement sommaire,” 20.05.1977, p.1. 
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intervention on Mobutu’s behalf. Pressure on Giscard to intervene became 
particularly intense as the Tigres drew near the town of Kolwezi, whose expatriate 
population of over 3,000 included some 600 French citizens.23  
Ultimately fearing the potentially negative international consequences of 
unilateral French involvement, Giscard decided to avoid a direct intervention. Instead, 
French diplomats helped to persuade Morocco’s King Hassan II to send troops. 
Hassan shared French fears of communist influence on the continent, particularly 
given his struggle with Polisario in the Western Sahara and its left-leaning Algerian 
supporters. Giscard offered to transport vehicles and equipment for the 1,500 
Moroccan troops sent to defeat the Gendarmes.  
Despite public affirmations that he had limited French military assistance to 
providing logistical support to the Moroccans, French involvement was actually far 
more substantial. 24  This included advisors attached to the Zairian ministry of 
defence to help manage war planning, training of airborne and mortar units, taking 
control of the entire FAZ logistics chain, maintenance and repair of FAZ vehicles and 
aircraft, and conducting aerial reconnaissance missions.25 French aid, stiffened by 
the presence of a large Moroccan force, helped to improve both the capacity and 
morale of FAZ units who began moving into Tigre-held territory. The slow advance of 
the FAZ and its Moroccan allies allowed the Katangans to withdraw back to Angola. 
By the end of May 1977, Mobutu could declare victory as the last of the Gendarmes 
left Zaire.  
French policymakers congratulated themselves for what they perceived as their 
decisive contribution to Zairian “victory.” However, soon it became clear that this 
represented little more than a respite. The Tigres had suffered few casualties and 
had regrouped. Over the course of the next year, numerous intelligence reports 
filtered into Kinshasa, and onwards to Paris, indicating a substantial Cuban role in 
arming, training, and planning the FLNC’s next moves. This led to heightened 
anxieties linked to Cold War concerns over communist threats to Zaire. A number of 
cross-border raids also presaged a renewed invasion of the country.  
This materialized on May 13, 1978, when some 2,000–2,500 Katangan 
Gendarmes, having bypassed the Angolan border through Zambia, struck directly at 
Kolwezi itself. Local FAZ units quickly collapsed or retreated. Suddenly, the 
Katangans had control of the most important mining center in Zaire, and a city 
containing over 3,000 European expatriates. Within less than a week, geopolitical 
fears about the breakup of Zaire and communist expansion combined with reports 
that the Katangans had started executing Europeans in the city. This prompted 
                                            
23 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975-1978, Carton 27, 27/2, Dêpeche d’actualité, “A/s : Le 
temps des oppositions?,” 31.03.1977. 
24  MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre,” 1975–1978, Carton 27, 27/1, Note, “A/s. Transport 
d’éléments militaires marocains vers le Zaïre,” 28.04.1977, p. 2. 
25 Powell, “Cuba of the West?” 
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Giscard, on the advice of Ambassador André Ross and Colonel Yves Gras, the head 
of the French military mission in Zaire, to launch an airborne assault on Kolwezi. 
  Meanwhile, the threat to their expatriates also led the Belgian government to 
organize a military intervention. Both France and Belgium required American 
assistance in the form of heavy-lift capacity to effectively project force at such a 
distance from their home countries. While they had planes for their own troops, they 
needed American C-141s to transport fuel, ammunition, and equipment. The Carter 
administration quickly agreed to both countries’ requests, not least because some 
eighty American citizens also worked in the Kolwezi area, though Washington 
stipulated that its aircraft could not enter the combat zone.26 
Despite American agreement to support both interventions, French and Belgian 
policymakers had opposing goals. Apart from rescuing the city’s European (and 
particularly French) population, the primary aim of French officials was to stabilize 
Mobutu’s regime.27 This meant two things. First, it meant defeating the FLNC and 
driving it out of Zaire. Second, it meant encouraging Kolwezi’s expatriates to remain 
in Shaba, as their presence was crucial to Gécamines’ operations and thus, the 
Zairian economy. Brussels though, exhibited less willingness to risk the lives of its 
soldiers in defence of Mobutu. Instead, the Belgian government ordered a pure 
evacuation operation. For this, a large crack force of Paracommandos would land at 
Kolwezi’s airstrip, recently retaken by Mobutu’s troops, and evacuate the city’s 
European population, only using force if the Katangans proved uncooperative.  
This plan infuriated French officials, since they feared that the removal of the 
highly skilled European labor force would have an enormously negative impact on 
Shaba’s economy. French observers feared that a massive evacuation of 
expatriates from Kolwezi would trigger similar evacuations among the European 
populations living in Likasi, Lubumbashi, and other important mining centers in 
Shaba. Partly as a result of these disagreements, along with confused attempts at 
coordination, the first wave of the French 2nd Régiment étranger de parachutists (2nd 
REP) attacked Kolwezi in the late afternoon of May 19, 1978, a day before the 
Belgians. The following day, the 2nd REP’s second wave jumped on the city, while 
the Belgian Paracommando Regiment landed at the airfield to begin evacuating the 
European population.  
Lack of coordination and communication between the two forces resulted in 
confusion and led to at least one friendly fire incident.28 After Colonel Yves Gras, 
                                            
26 JCL, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material 6, Box 87 (Country File Yugoslavia: 3-5/80 
through Zaire 1/79-1/81), Folder: (Zaire 1-5/1978), Doc. 44, Chronology, undated. 
27 Intervention of Yves Gras, in Samy Cohen and Marie-Claude Smouts, eds., La politique 
extérieure de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences 
politiques, 1985), 321. 
28 Thomas P. Odom, Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978 (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 79–80. 
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who oversaw the French operation from a flying command post, and Colonel Rik 
Depoorter, the Belgian commander, realized the dangers, they briefly met on the 
ground at Kolwezi’s airfield. Gras insisted that the Belgians halt their evacuations of 
Europeans, to no avail.29  
By the time the French and Belgians arrived, the Katangans had already mostly 
retreated. Nonetheless, French forces lost five killed and twenty wounded in a series 
of sharp engagements in and around the town.30 Meanwhile, the Belgian troops 
focused on their evacuation mission, and avoided combat. The death toll was grim. 
French troops counted some 131 dead European civilians,31 of whom fifteen were 
French.32 In retrospect, and given the available evidence, it seems likely that the 
killings did not stem from a deliberate FLNC plan, but rather due to a breakdown in 
discipline, revenge-taking, and simultaneous FAZ killings of expatriates, possibly in 
order to trigger a Western intervention.33 Furthermore, French forces had killed 
some 250 Tigres.34  
Worst of all, French officials reported that nearly 1,000 Zairian civilians lay dead. 
They blamed much of the killing on the Katangan invaders who apparently targeted 
people who did not belong to the locally dominant Lunda community.35 One British 
RAF officer, sent to Kolwezi in the days following the French and Belgian 
interventions to investigate the deaths of several British citizens, wrote that the 
bloodbath was such that, “you can smell Kolwezi from many miles away.”36  
Within days of their arrival, Belgian forces had evacuated nearly the entire 
European population of Kolwezi.37 Colonel Philippe Erulin, commander of the 2nd 
REP, complained in a letter to his wife, “The Belgian intervention has been 
catastrophic, and hurt our efforts with the Europeans. I had succeeded in containing 
                                            
29 Ibid., 81. 
30 See list in Pierre Sergent, La Légion saute sur Kolwezi: opération Léopard: Le 2e R.E.P. au 
Zaïre, mai-juin 1978 (Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1978), 227. 
31 Ibid. 
32 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 29, Note, “Français disparus et décédés: 
Situation au 22 juin 1978,” 22.06.1978. 
33 See my discussion of the evidence in Nathaniel Powell, “France’s African Wars, 1974–1981,” 
(Ph.D. Diss., Graduate Institute of International Studies (IHEID), Geneva, 2013), 121–132. 
34 Gras, “L’Opération Kolwezi,” p. 702n; and Sergent, La Légion, 228. 
35 Erulin claimed the figure was closer to 700. See Erulin in Boissonnade, Le mal zaïrois, 441; 
and MAE Nantes Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 45 Consulat Lubumbashi, Dossier “1978,” Dépêche 
d’actualité, “A/S: Le mois de Mai 1978 au Zaïre,” from Ross to Paris, 08.06.1978, p. 8.  
36 The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (henceforth TNA), FCO 31/2290, “Zaire—
Shaba Invasion 1978," Telegram from Lusaka Embassy to Foreign Office, 22.05.1978.  
37 Général Yves Gras, “L’Opération Kolwezi,” Mondes et Cultures 45, 4 (1985), 702. 
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the panic until their arrival. I wonder if Zaire will survive after this fatal blow to its 
economy.”38  
Although the invasion damaged some of Kolwezi’s mining infrastructure, the 
damage was less widespread than initially feared. Apart from surface structures 
such as workshops, and some vehicles, the Gendarmes seemed to have committed 
no acts of deliberate destruction. A temporary loss of electricity meant that water 
pumps had stopped working and some of the mineshafts flooded in consequence. It 
seemed though that the mines could return to working order within a matter of 
weeks.39 Despite this, without the crucial presence of expatriate technicians within 
Gécamines, the entire mining economy of Shaba ran the risk of ruin. For French 
officials then, it became imperative to stabilize Shaba and provide enough security to 
encourage the expatriate population to remain or return. 
In the immediate term, Colonels Erulin and Gras tried to assuage the fears of 
Europeans in other parts of Shaba. Erulin sent detachments of legionnaires to 
different towns and settlements throughout the province as far to the east as Likasi, 
to calm the European population and to make a show of force to dissuade further 
FLNC attacks or a popular uprising.40 Nevertheless, expelling the Gendarmes did 
not suffice to restore a climate of security and confidence for the Europeans. 
As soon as the fighting had ended and the 2nd REP had secured Kolwezi from 
the Katangans, elements of FAZ units who had regrouped took vengeance upon the 
local population. Erulin lamented to his wife upon leaving Kolwezi on May 28, “I’ve 
left the city in the hands of the looters of the Zairian army.”41 The remaining 
European expatriates in Shaba made it clear to local French authorities that they 
feared the FAZ nearly as much as they did the Katangans.42     
Not everyone appreciated the French presence either. Belgian soldiers, already 
suspicious about French motives, complained about the rough treatment that French 
troops appeared to mete out to some of the local population.43 Allegations of bad 
behavior followed French troops as they withdrew to Lubumbashi, Shaba’s capital. 
There, the rabbi of the local expatriate Jewish community offered his home, as well 
as the adjoining synagogue to Colonel Erulin to serve as his headquarters in the city. 
                                            
38 Erulin cited in Euloge Boissonnade, Le mal zaïrois (Paris: Hermé, 1990), 434. 
39 MAE Nantes Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 45, Dossier “1978,” Telegram from Ross to Paris, 
“Etat des installations minières à Kolwezi,” 27.05.1978. 
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42 MAE Nantes Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 51, Dossier Force I.Africaine et aide militaire, 
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43 Odom, Shaba II, 81. 
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The French deputy consul later reported, though, that the legionnaires had pillaged 
the rabbi’s house, stealing electronic equipment, money, and jewelry, and had 
damaged furniture and the electrical system.44 The FAZ apparently did not have a 
monopoly on looting. 
Despite the dramatic intervention at Kolwezi and the repulse of the FLNC, the 
Katangan Gendarmes managed to withdrawal in good order.45 This meant that little 
could prevent a Shaba III at some future date.46 Clearly the FAZ was in no position 
to prevent, or even effectively combat a renewed invasion. Its abysmal performance 
and lack of discipline contributed to the total lack of confidence placed in it by 
Shaba’s European expatriate community.  
Interestingly, French military intelligence noted that the FAZ had in fact suffered 
few losses from the Gendarme invasion. This resulted from the fact that:  
Most of the units disbanded at first contact with the FNLC [sic]. Some 
troops even joined the rebel ranks. Because of this fact, losses were 
negligible. No structural reform, dissolution, merger, or creation of new 
units has been undertaken in recent days, even though numerous units, 
including the 14th Brigade, literally vanished.47  
General Babia, the Zairian chief of staff, informed the military attachés of the French, 
Belgian, and American embassies that the FAZ could not hold Kolwezi in case of a 
renewed attack. He estimated that he would need at least three months to effectively 
reorganize the Zairian 14th Brigade, the unit charged with Kolwezi’s defense, and 
deploy the infantry units that Belgian officials had agreed to train.48  
Furthermore, Mobutu’s actions following Shaba II threatened to worsen an 
already tense situation. Mobutu removed politically unreliable officers from the FAZ, 
despite their level of competence. He also tried and convicted the 14th Brigade’s 
commander, General Tshikeva, of cowardice and sentenced him to death. French 
intelligence officers viewed this move with approval. They lamented Mobutu’s later 
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decision to commute the sentence to a prison term, fearing that, “this clemency risks 
being interpreted as a sign of weakness.”49 
Furthermore, Mobutu’s decided to impose martial law in Shaba. As a “security” 
measure, he declared in a press conference that “Agriculture will no longer be 
practiced and the population will no longer live along the Zairian-Angolan border.”50 
Additionally, the only valid identity papers for Shaba residents would be their working 
documents. As the UNHCR noted, only salaried workers had such documentation 
available, which made the vast majority of the population extremely vulnerable to 
officially sanctioned persecution.51  
A “Strongly Paternal Line” and the IMF   
Despite the relatively limited damage to Kolwezi’s mining infrastructure, Zaire’s 
economy teetered on the brink of catastrophe. Zaire’s Western backers struggled to 
develop a strategy aimed at stabilizing the country and preventing renewed conflict. 
The words of J.A.N. Graham, Deputy-Undersecretary for the Middle East and Africa 
in the British Foreign Office, well summarize the general attitude of many Western 
policymakers in Kolwezi’s aftermath: 
In the longer term some improved co-ordination with our European 
partners might contribute to general improvement in government in 
these countries. Part of the problem is that some of these countries 
which are regarded as friendly to the West are in themselves neither 
admirable nor stable. If our aid is not to be wasted, and if we are not to 
find ourselves in the position of defending the indefensible, we need 
perhaps to take a more strongly paternal line, as indeed the French 
Government does in many of the francophone countries. Again, this is 
extremely delicate and could not be applied unless the government 
concerned was prepared to co-operate. But it is with this thought in 
mind that I believe it would be a great mistake to allow the IMF and 
Belgian effort to do something about the Zairian economy to be 
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delayed. Getting that right seems to me the first step to improving the 
situation in Zaire.52  
In mid-June, Belgium hosted a conference on Zairian economic recovery and 
stabilization. Along with Zaire, Belgium, France, and the United States, delegations 
from Canada, West Germany, Iran, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the 
World Bank, and the IMF attended the meeting. The so-called “Mobutu Plan” 
constituted the main object of discussion. Although Mobutu’s “diplomacy of 
bankruptcy”53 does not directly concern this study, a brief outline does serve to 
illustrate the ways that Mobutu managed to game the system to his own benefit. 
Also, IMF records show how Mobutu’s Western backers and their “strongly paternal 
line” contributed in some ways to exacerbating the regime’s corruption and the 
country’s economic woes.  
Of course, Western officials did not quite see it this way. Henri Simonet, 
Belgium’s foreign minister, saw the IMF as a useful tool for safeguarding Western 
political and economic interests. In late May 1978, he met with Fund officials to 
discuss the upcoming meeting in Brussels. In Simonet’s view, “The economic 
considerations will need to go hand in hand with political ones and, in that 
connection, the IMF could play a vital role in paving the way for economic and 
financial stability.” 54  Simonet noted that though Zaire’s Western partners had 
planned this meeting long before Shaba II, the timing was now perfect since Mobutu 
had no choice but to accept Western “advice” and that “it would be wise to act while 
the iron was hot.”55  
Mobutu deftly exploited this sentiment. His “Mobutu Plan” consisted of precisely 
those measures that his Western backers demanded, and even lay some of the 
blame for Zaire’s fiscal and economic problems on governmental corruption and 
incompetence. To address these issues, the Zairian regime promised to improve 
Zaire’s state institutions, to prepare an economic stabilization program, and to 
increase productivity in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing.56 The regime also 
declared itself willing to accept the appointment of a foreign expert as a chief 
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comptroller in the finance ministry, with full control and veto power over public 
spending.57 
Unfortunately for Mobutu, apart from emergency humanitarian assistance, most 
donor countries seemed unwilling to provide much economic assistance until he had 
agreed upon a stabilization program with the IMF. The IMF, on the other hand, did 
not want to draw up a stabilization program until it had received serious funding 
commitments from Zaire’s donors. Though this commitment problem prevented an 
agreement on a stabilization program until 1979, Mobutu did take measures that 
signaled an apparently serious effort to reform. In addition to a comptroller, Mobutu 
had, in theory, agreed to foreign control or supervision of the customs administration 
and the central bank. French officials wanted these foreign technocrats to coordinate 
their policies on a steering committee, which would report directly to the IMF. 
Mobutu, however, managed to dilute this into an advisory commission within the 
Zairian government.58 Nonetheless, over the course of the next few months, he 
made other moves demanded by the IMF as prerequisites for contributing towards 
the financing of a stabilization program. 
One of the most important policies, in the IMF’s view, consisted of a major 
exchange-rate devaluation aimed at reversing Zaire’s balance of payment problems, 
improving Gécamines financial situation, and increasing productivity. 59  This 
devaluation became the subject of some debate as IMF head Jacques de Larosière 
met with Erwin Blumenthal, the newly appointed West German principal director of 
the Zairian Central Bank in early October 1978.  
Blumenthal explained to Fund officials that, though he felt that Zaire needed a 
large currency devaluation, “a very large one-step devaluation would be 
counterproductive. It would have many undesirable social and political repercussions 
….” He also indicated that a large part of Kinshasa’s population lived at starvation 
levels. While the prices of luxury products were at black-market rates, most low-end 
consumer goods, particularly basic food and fuel, remained close to official prices. 
Thus a major devaluation would introduce immediate price increases in an already 
fragile socioeconomic situation. Instead, he argued for a staggered devaluation, 
eventually reaching 50 percent over six months.60  
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Fund officials initially balked at this, fearing that drastic measures would be 
required before they could sign onto a stabilization package. Nonetheless, 
Blumenthal emphasized that, “if donors wait too long, and insist that every last 
reform measure be in place before giving any further aid, it may be too late to 
stabilize anything.”61 He convinced Larosière that, “if the donors waited too long, 
they might kill the patient in the process.”62 Larosière insisted in return that for this to 
happen, “it was very important to convince aid donors that a change in attitudes in 
Zaire was taking place,” and noted that devaluation and budget controls were the 
best ways to do this.63  
Mobutu did enact a series of devaluations, beginning at the end of October 1978, 
and eventually reaching 50 percent versus the SDR64 by January 1979.65 Despite 
Blumenthal’s efforts to minimize its impact on the population, the Bank of Zaire 
reported that prices of basic goods in shops and markets increased drastically 
during this period. From October 1978 to April 1979, the Bank reported that shop 
prices increased on average over 50 percent, and food prices in markets increased 
by nearly 35 percent. These rates were significantly higher than the inflation 
experienced the previous year, and the Bank attributed this principally to the 
devaluation.66 Despite the hardships this program inflicted upon many of Zaire’s 
urban poor, it signaled Mobutu’s apparent seriousness to the IMF and Zaire’s donors. 
This led to an IMF agreement to finance an eighteen-month “stabilization program” 
with 118 million SDR in July 1979. This triggered lines of credit from other donors 
and significantly bolstered Mobutu’s regime.67  
The process by which this took place provides a fascinating illustration of the 
ways Mobutu managed his international relationships. In September 1978, a World 
Bank assessment mission visited Gécamines in Shaba. It returned with a very 
pessimistic evaluation. It reported that the Zairian government’s interference with 
Gécamines seriously threatened its autonomy. The regime also diverted much of the 
company’s earnings into special accounts. Management had collapsed, employee 
morale had fallen, and staffing problems threatened productivity. Furthermore, the 
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lack of expatriate staff occasioned by the Shaba invasions had impaired 
maintenance work and contributed to a gradual decline in production.68 
 Before 1978, Gécamines had sold its products through SGM, a Belgian 
marketing company, which pre-financed 70 percent of the various minerals’ market 
value, and settled the remaining difference after sale. The regime altered this 
procedure in January 1978. Now the difference would accrue to the office of the 
presidency, i.e., Mobutu. Meanwhile, cobalt prices tripled during the year, and thus 
the regime reaped an enormous profit. The World Bank mission estimated that this 
included a shipment of 5,000 tons of cobalt, which would bring the presidency some 
100 million SDR by year’s end.69 This of course would not be used to plug budget 
shortfalls or service the country’s ballooning debt.  
In the same vein, the World Bank mission discovered that some 10 percent of 
Gécamines’ copper went unsold. Instead the regime “ceded” it in barter agreements 
to a number of different countries, including 10,000 tons to France in exchange for 
helicopters and 24,000 tons to Italy in exchange for aircraft.70 This of course meant 
that Zaire could not benefit from the sale of this copper to mitigate some of its 
balance of payment difficulties. It also illustrated the willingness of some of Zaire’s 
Western partners, notably France, to facilitate Mobutu’s ability to sacrifice his 
country’s financial and economic credibility to enrich himself and those around him. 
Barter agreements like this provided an easy way for Mobutu to avoid the kind of 
public expenditures for military equipment, which drew the ire of foreign creditors. 
Unfortunately for Mobutu, international assessment missions like that of the 
World Bank, threatened his credibility with donors. It remained important for him to 
maintain the appearance of external supervision and control, even while subtly 
removing the real power held by figures like Blumenthal. In his negotiations with the 
IMF for a stand-by financing agreement for a stabilization program, Mobutu 
attempted to do just this. In a letter to Larosière in February 1979, Blumenthal 
vehemently protested what he saw as a blatant attempt by Zairian authorities to 
undermine his real role by changing the scope of his mission. Blumenthal scathingly 
criticized the wording of the Zairians’ draft “letter of intent,” which represented the 
initial step towards an IMF loan agreement, as an “anti-Blumenthal law in 
disguise.” 71  The letter’s wording removed responsibility for monetary decision-
making from the Central Bank, and placed it in the hands of a government 
committee. Blumenthal observed that this represented a clear demonstration of 
                                            
68 IMF Archives, African Department Fonds, AFR Country Division Desk Files Zaire, Box 72, 
Memorandum for Files, “Zaïre—Meeting with the IBRD and the Zaïrian [sic] Delegation, September 
29, 1978, 2:00 p.m.,” 04.10.1978, p. 1–2. 
69 Ibid., p. 1. 
70 Ibid., p. 4. 
71 IMF Archives, Central Files Collection, Economic Subject Files S872, Box 306, Letter from 
Blumenthal to Larosière, 24.02.1979, p. 1. 
Saving Mobutu: Zaire, the West, and the Inter-African Force, 1978–1979     17 
 
Zairian intentions.72 It removed even the nominal degree of independence afforded 
to the Central Bank, yet the IMF seemed to accept the implication.  
Although the wording in the letter eventually did change to reflect Blumenthal’s 
concerns,73 he informed IMF officials that he no longer thought he could effectively 
perform his job.74 His situation grew worse over the coming months. In April, a 
candidate for the comptroller in the finance ministry had finally been found, but 
without the agreed veto powers over expenditure.75 This left Blumenthal increasingly 
frustrated and he soon left his position in disgust.  
In a famous report written several years later,76 Blumenthal detailed the level of 
corruption in the regime and the ways in which Mobutu managed to gut his onerous 
international commitments of their substance, while still maintaining appearances in 
the eyes of international partners. Blumenthal was even once threatened at gunpoint 
to hand over Central Bank money to a FAZ general.77 Blumenthal wrote this report 
in early 1982 after the IMF had agreed to several major loans in the course of the 
preceding years.  
His report highlighted the enormous lack of credibility in Zaire’s political, 
economic, and financial institutions. It warned creditors, particularly states, that, 
“Mobutu and his government mock the question of debt reimbursement and the 
public debt. Above all, they count on the generosity of their creditors and on the 
indefinite renewal of loans and their reimbursement.”78 Indeed, by the end of 1980, 
Zaire’s external debt had reached 4.5 billion dollars.79 Blumenthal noted that every 
single IMF program to date had failed in Zaire, which begged the following 
questions: 
why hasn’t the IMF, why haven’t the donor countries abandoned rather 
than renewed their commitments each time? Why has there been such 
a failure that will certainly continue if no radical change occurs? […] 
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And for what reasons do Western countries persist in giving not only 
loans, but also non-refundable grants?80 
After listing numerous instances of corruption, Blumenthal warned that, “there is no, I 
repeat no chance on the horizon that Zaire’s numerous creditors recover their 
funds.” 81  This blind commitment to Mobutu’s survival and other needs also 
translated into the post-Kolwezi security architecture that Zaire’s Western allies tried 
to implement at the same time.  
A Western Coalition? 
In the aftermath of Shaba II, neither French nor Belgian policymakers wished their 
troops to remain in the province indefinitely. As noted above, Belgian authorities felt 
uncomfortable about extending their mission beyond that of a simple evacuation of 
foreign personnel. This conflicted with the French desire to stabilize the province in 
order to encourage the expatriates to remain.  
Nonetheless, many in the expatriate community made clear to anyone who 
would listen that they did not trust the FAZ to provide security, and would leave Zaire 
without a more disciplined and better trained stabilization force.82 In the weeks 
following the Kolwezi raid, Belgian military intelligence, the SGR, conducted long 
debriefings of Belgian civilian eyewitnesses. Their testimony illustrated the extent of 
their fears of the future.  
Claude Renard, the Belgian Director of Gécamines operations in Kolwezi, saw 
the Shaba invasions and their consequences in racially-tinged and apocalyptic terms. 
His views are worth examining at length, as he was an important member of the 
local expatriate elite and his views echoed those expressed by many of his 
compatriots. Belgian intelligence officials also highly respected his opinions, and 
regarded him as a “good Belgian patriot.”83  
In his conversations with Belgian intelligence, Renard first highlighted the 
destructive behavior of the FAZ towards the local population, and partly blamed their 
activities for the outbreak of violence against expatriates and others. He likened the 
violence to the revenge killings conducted by certain Resistance groups following 
the Nazi occupation in 1945. However, unlike the Resistance, according to Renard’s 
racial prism: 
Within a cowardly black mass, there is no noble aspect to vengeance; 
it is score-settling, a free-for-all, a surge of hatred, sexual gratification. 
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Their race is like that. Even when the Russians become masters of 
Kolwezi, they’ll have a lot of problems, especially if they entrust 
monitoring and occupation missions to Cuban chi-chi boys.84 
Renard emphasized that Shaba’s importance for the West (particularly as a major 
repository of the world’s cobalt) meant that the Kolwezi raid was a “Pearl Harbor,” 
and the true beginning of the Third World War. He felt that the deployment of a Pan-
African force to the province would be a “carnival” and next to useless. Instead, he 
strongly advocated maintaining an “organized white military force,” since “white = 
seriousness = security.” He also suggested that Gécamines should henceforth only 
employ single white men as expatriate workers, and arm them, since rebels “like to 
attack disarmed people.”85  
Another Belgian Kolwezi resident, listed in the Belgian intelligence files as an 
unnamed teacher, declared that the FAZ was the “number one enemy” in Shaba and 
described them as “vermin.” When the FAZ were in charge it was, “the reign of 
authorized banditry.” He attributed at least some of the violence in Kolwezi to the 
FAZ itself, though partly on the basis of odd racial theories about the character of 
“Bantus.” Like Renard, he pleaded the need for a “serious” security force deployed in 
Shaba, and would not return there without one.86  
One should note in passing that some observers linked local perceptions of 
expatriate racism to the violence meted out to Europeans by some of Kolwezi’s 
population during the FLNC occupation. This overt racism, combined with severe 
food shortages and highly visible wealth disparities between locals and foreigners 
generated substantial resentment. When the Katangans “liberated” the city, 
desperate need for food and bitterness towards the expatriate elite certainly 
contributed to some of the atrocities.87  
Meanwhile, in the days following Shaba II, Belgian intelligence reports 
suggested that the Katangan invasion merely represented one element of a much 
broader threat to Zaire.88 A small rebel incursion from Sudan towards the end of the 
month reinforced this perception. 89  These fears, along with the fears of their 
expatriates, may have helped to push Belgian policy in the direction of supporting a 
broader stabilization operation. Despite the initial 72-hour mandate given to the 
Belgian Paracommando Regiment, on May 22, the Belgian cabinet decided to leave 
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one of the regiment’s battalions at Kamina, a large airbase in north-central Shaba as 
the rest of the unit withdrew. 
According to British observers, another reason that may have pushed Belgian 
policymakers into extending their commitment to Zaire related to their suspicion of 
French motives. Belgian officials may have viewed the French decision to prolong 
the stay of the 2nd REP as a means of gaining a “disproportionate political advantage” 
over the Belgian position in Zaire.90 It was no secret that the French operation in 
Kolwezi had broader aims that went beyond the simple protection of European 
expatriates. French foreign minister Louis de Guiringaud explicitly told his British 
interlocutors that France had four aims in Shaba; protecting the European population, 
evacuating those who wished to leave, helping Zaire restore security in Kolwezi, and, 
“not to leave Kolwezi until the Zairians had the situation again in hand,” though 
Guiringaud thought this would take little more than a week.91  
The combined fears regarding their remaining (and returning) expatriates in 
Shaba, French motives, and Zaire’s instability, led Belgian policymakers to reflect on 
the kind of broader commitment they could and should make in Zaire. To some 
extent though, divisions within the governing coalition in Brussels made it difficult to 
develop a coherent policy. Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, a Christian Democrat, 
seemed more sympathetic to French methods than Socialist Foreign Minister Henri 
Simonet, who took a harder anti-Mobutu line. This reflected the hostility felt within 
the Socialist Party towards Belgian support for Mobutu or association with what its 
membership perceived as France’s “strong-arm methods” in Africa.92 The policy line 
that emerged from this disagreement within the Belgian government essentially 
revolved around achieving a level of stability in Zaire that would allow the departure 
of Belgium’s remaining troops while permitting Brussels to credibly maintain that 
their intervention had solely humanitarian motives and had not aimed at propping up 
the local dictator.93  
To this end, Simonet outlined his view on possible post-Kolwezi options to 
Zaire’s Western backers. He suggested that there existed four options available for 
stabilizing Shaba: 
 
(A) Security of Shaba to be guaranteed entirely by Zaire national forces. 
(B) A combined African force should be put together to do the job. 
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(C) An international force be assembled to include European forces. 
(D) The Franco/Belgian military presence be maintained.94  
He ruled out option A as completely unrealistic and felt that option D would face too 
much political opposition. He saw option B as the most desirable, possibly under the 
framework of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).95 Option C, seeing as it 
required a larger European and, perhaps UN commitment, also seemed like a 
nonstarter.  
British policymakers, who had contributed to the Belgian evacuation effort by 
providing airlift assistance from aircraft stationed in Zambia, also preferred option B. 
British foreign secretary David Owen wrote that while he would “need convincing” 
that option A was unviable, he had a “strong preference” for option B if option A was 
unworkable. He felt that option C, “would be in my view misguided,” and worried that 
any deep British commitment in support of Mobutu would risk Britain’s relationship 
with neighboring Zambia.96  
Meanwhile, French policymakers, along with Mobutu, had already taken the 
initiative in organizing what Simonet had described as “option B.” French officials, 
despite feeling much less embarrassment for their support to Mobutu, faced the 
dilemma that their “humanitarian” mission could not turn into a long-term dissuasive 
presence or “pacification” operation without losing the character of its original 
publicly stated mandate. 97  This might threaten its international legitimacy, the 
important logistical backing it received from the United States, and other forms of 
overt support from France’s Western partners.  
Thus French diplomats began pushing for the IAF. This would provide a wider 
African dimension to the internationalization of the Shaba crisis. It would also help to 
legitimize foreign military intervention in Zaire by giving it an African veneer. Shortly 
after the Kolwezi operation, Ambassador André Ross observed: 
It is indeed from Africa, supported by Westerners that Zaire can hope 
to receive the military aid which it urgently needs. Only outside forces 
can sustainably guarantee Shaba’s security in the face of the non-
negligible pressure that the FNLC [sic] continues to exert there. 
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Several thousand men will suffice. The limited nature of the required 
means makes it all the easier for this defense force to be constituted.98 
American officials also began to see a need for such a force, but hesitated on the 
level of commitment. Immediately following Shaba II, a working group meeting of the 
National Security Council’s Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) made several 
grim observations. First, the CIA noted that the Katangans could invade again, and 
the FAZ probably could not stop them. It also thought that the IAF could prove useful 
in detecting another invasion early enough to react. However, like their French and 
Belgian counterparts, the working group concluded, “The Zaire economy can be 
expected to spiral downward with the exodus of Europeans which will continue from 
all parts of Zaire unless the security situation can be changed. In a word, the outlook 
for the economy is disastrous.”99 
On May 25, Giscard and Carter discussed Zaire’s future on the occasion of a 
state dinner in Washington D.C. Giscard told a skeptical Carter that Mobutu was 
“courageous” and “a realist” and governed a country which, in Giscard’s view, “will 
be sooner or later destroyed by tribal struggles.” He worried greatly over the 
increase in Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa, which the French intervention 
served to deflect. Although he thanked Carter for the American logistical assistance 
provided in Shaba, he complained about the lack of a stronger American 
commitment to Africa’s defense. He told Carter that:  
Weaker countries have the impression that they can’t count on your 
support. I think it important that the Western democracies clearly show 
that they are ready to act when certain lines are crossed … People 
have to feel the presence of American power which should play an 
important role in the balance to be achieved. It’s something which is 
very deeply felt … As for us, we sent six hundred soldiers and that was 
enough.100  
The SCC met the following day to discuss the possible extent of American 
commitment to Zaire. It noted that the French and Belgians had begun developing 
ideas for an ambitious program of economic and political reform, supported by the 
presence of the IAF. Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, also 
observed that American participation in the Kolwezi operation had, “to some extent 
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… identified us with European attempts to preserve the situation in Zaire.”101 A 
deeper American engagement along Franco-Belgian lines would mean “we will have 
committed ourselves to an undertaking that will be costly with only a 50-50 chance of 
success. Most importantly, even the fact of consultations starts us on the road to 
commitment.”102  
Despite questionable future reform prospects, the SCC, with strong backing from 
officials in the State Department, agreed that, “Zaire is too important and the global 
stakes too high for the United States to continue its past posture of marginal support 
for the Zaire economic effort.”103 In Brzezinski’s somber analysis, “The alternative of 
not participating in this effort would probably lead to a rapid economic collapse in 
Zaire and political fragmentation of the country.”104 However, Brzezinski warned 
Carter that, in his view: 
deeper U.S. economic involvement will mean that Zaire will become 
politically more important to us and, success or failure, strategically 
more significant. In this connection, everyone agrees that, to the 
maximum extent possible, we should be junior partners to the 
Europeans and others in this development program.105  
Indeed, Carter’s talking points for his meeting with Giscard indicated that while the 
United States would support the airlift, the allies “must take care that this not seem 
to be a neocolonialist operation to protect our investments.”106  
This reasoning formed the basis of subsequent American policy towards Zaire 
and its relations with France and other Western partners regarding the deployment 
of the IAF in Shaba. American officials agreed to provide much of the airlift and 
some logistical support for the IAF’s deployment, but did not want to promise 
anything more.107 By free-riding on the Europeans, American policymakers hoped 
that they could distance themselves from Mobutu, and avoid the fallout should the 
international effort to save his regime fail. This free-riding approach would mar 
American relations with French officials, who consistently felt that the United States 
should bear more of the burden.  
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The Inter-African Force 
To lead the IAF, French officials again requested that the Moroccans return to 
Shaba. As discussed earlier, Morocco’s King Hassan II greatly feared communist 
expansion in Africa and connected consequences of destabilization in Zaire with his 
own conflict with Algeria over the Western Sahara. He thus agreed to lead the 
operation. 108  Furthermore, as Moroccan officials explained to their American 
counterparts, a Moroccan troop presence in Shaba would also “safeguard” 
Morocco’s supply line to the UNITA rebels it was supporting against the MPLA 
regime in Angola.109  
Although Morocco would form the backbone of the IAF, Hassan wanted much 
broader African participation.110 This required a significant diplomatic effort on the 
part of both the French and the Zairians. Thus within days of the victory over the 
Katangan Gendarmes, Mobutu, with French support, began to push for the 
establishment of the IAF. At the closing session of the Franco-African Summit in 
Paris, on May 23, Mobutu forcefully made his case for an African multinational 
deployment to the assembled grouping of francophone African leaders. He followed 
this up with personal visits to several African capitals, starting with Rabat.111  
Getting enough African political support was not a straightforward task, 
particularly given Mobutu’s general lack of popularity and legitimacy. Even Moroccan 
officials expressed doubts to their French interlocutors. King Hassan’s ambassador 
to Paris, Dr. Youssef Ben Abbès, lamented Mobutu’s complete lack of preparedness 
for the second Shaba invasion and privately wondered if there existed any Zairian 
who could replace Mobutu and conduct the necessary reforms.112   
Before the first French troops had even landed in Kolwezi on May 19, French 
diplomats had begun to sound out the Senegalese government for a possible post-
invasion deployment to Zaire. President Léopold Sédar Senghor agreed to send a 
unit in support of French efforts. However, his Army chief of staff, General Idrissa 
Fall, told the French military attaché in Dakar that this would pose a major problem. 
Senegal had already sent a large contingent of troops to Lebanon as part of the 
UNIFIL peacekeeping operation. This meant that any other major deployment would 
seriously tax the resources of the Senegalese army. The army could therefore only 
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afford to send a small number of troops in symbolic support of a larger force.113 
Furthermore, the mere fact of supporting Mobutu could provoke Senghor’s domestic 
political opposition, due to Mobutu’s unpopularity in the country resulting from his 
expulsion of Senegalese traders in 1971.114  
Nevertheless, in early June, as the first Moroccan contingents prepared to 
deploy to Zaire, Senegalese officials decided to send a large “reinforced battalion.” 
This move surprised French authorities, since they had made preparations to 
provide logistical and transportation assistance for a single company, as Fall had 
suggested.115 The French ambassador, Pierre Morizot, felt that this significantly 
increased number of troops represented an attempt by Fall to sabotage the 
deployment by forcing France to refuse support to a much larger contingent than 
planned. Although Fall was opposed to any deployment to Zaire, he had apparently 
told Senghor that in case the situation in Shaba deteriorated, a single company 
would not suffice for even self-defense purposes. As Prime Minister Abdou Diouf 
asked Morizet, “Between us, what confidence can we place in the Togolese and 
Gabonese companies? What would be my responsibility if I didn’t take into account 
the advice of my military experts, and if the Senegalese detachment suffered a 
disaster because of that?”116  
The military environment in Shaba also worried Senegalese officials. In addition 
to their lack of confidence in other African contingents, the FAZ posed a veritable 
threat. Senghor noted that Mobutu’s previous military policy and consequent FAZ 
deficiencies might inspire disloyalty in the Zairian army. The IAF might have to 
prepare for a tense situation in Shaba where FAZ troops could turn on their erstwhile 
allies.117 
Giscard paralleled these efforts with a meeting held in Paris on June 5, 
gathering representatives from the West German, American, Belgian, and British 
governments. Initially, he wanted this meeting to focus on developing a collective 
strategy towards Africa as a whole, particularly in light of the “destabilization” 
supposedly introduced on the continent by Soviet bloc activity.118 French officials 
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aimed to establish a military cooperation mechanism comprised of a joint general 
staff committee.119  
Unfortunately for Giscard, the American delegation, implicitly backed by the 
other countries present, insisted that the meeting focus on Zaire’s problems 
alone.120 Although no one made any binding commitments, the participants did 
agree to a series of demands for reforms in Zaire. They collectively presented these 
to Mobutu as conditions for further Western aid to the country. 121  These 
“recommendations,” demanded an effort by Mobutu towards national reconciliation, 
improved institutions, improvements in the army, efforts at finding diplomatic 
solutions to Zaire’s external problems, and reforms in Zaire’s economic policy. True 
to form, Mobutu told Ross that “there was no point of disagreement” with these 
demands.122 Although this seemed to satisfy his interlocutors, as noted above, the 
future would demonstrate that Mobutu had little intention of following through with 
most of his promises.  
On the same day, barely two weeks after the Kolwezi operation, the IAF began 
to deploy to Shaba.123 At its full strength, it consisted of some 1,500 Moroccan, 560 
Senegalese, 150 Togolese, and 50 Gabonese troops, all under the nominal 
command of Moroccan Colonel-Major Loubaris, the same officer who had 
commanded Moroccan forces during Shaba I. It also included a 200-man strong 
medical detachment from Ivory Coast.124 French and American aircraft transported 
these troops, with both countries also providing some vehicles and other equipment 
to the units.125 The French Foreign Legion also left behind vehicles used during their 
intervention for the Moroccans to distribute among the IAF.126 In the meantime, 
                                            
119 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 24, 24/1, Telegram from Paris to Dakar, 
“Force d’Intervention Africaine,” 09.06.1978. 
120 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 21, 21/3, DAM Note, “A/s. Zaïre,” 
09.06.1978, p. 2. 
121 Ibid., p. 3. 
122 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 21, 21/3, DAM Note, “A/s. Zaïre,” 
21.06.1978, p. 2. 
123 MAE Nantes Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 51, Dossier Force I. Africaine et aide militaire, 
“La Force Inter Africaine au Shaba—bilan,” Kinshasa Embassy report on the IAF, 06.09.1979, p. 4. 
124 Ibid., p. 5 
125 Ibid. 
126 MAE Nantes Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 51, Dossier Force I. Africaine et aide militaire, 
Note à l’intention de Monsieur l’Ambassadeur de France, “Problèmes relatifs au retrait de la Force 
Inter Africaine,” from French military attaché, Kinshasa, 24.04.1979, p. 2 
Saving Mobutu: Zaire, the West, and the Inter-African Force, 1978–1979     27 
 
French officials agreed to train a Zairian rapid intervention airborne brigade, while 
their Belgian counterparts agreed to train infantry units.127  
While the IAF deployment could deter a third invasion, a broader reduction of 
tensions would require a substantial diplomatic effort to reconcile Mobutu with 
Angolan President Agostinho Neto and his ruling MPLA regime. In July 1978, with 
American encouragement Congolese leader Denis Sassou-Nguesso agreed to 
mediate between the two leaders.128 On July 18, Mobutu and Neto formally met at 
an OAU summit meeting in Khartoum, and sketched the outline of an agreement.  
Mobutu would end his support for a number of Angolan opposition groups, 
particularly the FNLA, FLEC, and UNITA. In exchange, Neto would disarm the 
Katangans, remove them from the border zone, and reopen the Benguela railroad, 
which linked Shaba’s exports to the Atlantic Ocean. Furthermore, both sides agreed 
to normalize diplomatic relations. The two leaders made the accord public on August 
19 as Neto made a two-day visit to Kinshasa.129 Mobutu also made an amnesty offer, 
permitting some 150,000 Zairian refugees to return to Zaire from Angola.130 This 
would help to undercut the Tigres’ base of support in Angola, as many of the 
refugees were from Shaba’s Lunda community, which formed the FLNC’s main 
constituency. 
Interestingly, while French officials approved of the accord, René Journiac, 
Giscard’s chief Africa advisor, told Richard Moose, the US assistant secretary of 
state for African affairs, that UNITA should not be dropped. While Journiac viewed 
FLEC and FNLA as “not militarily serious,” UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi should be, 
“kept available.” Journiac regarded Savimbi as a “type of leader all too rare in the 
world and should at some time have a role to play in Angola.” Given that UNITA 
represented the most powerful internal threat to the MPLA at the time, it seemed that 
the French at least had no intention of letting Mobutu’s reconciliation with Neto 
interfere with their own destabilization projects.131  
This reconciliation with Angola’s leadership, which ostensibly removed or at 
least significantly reduced the external threat to Shaba, created concomitant 
problems for the IAF. The second Shaba invasion had worsened the uncertainty 
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surrounding an already desperate economic situation in the province and insecurity 
was rife. The FAZ and Zairian police were unable to impose government authority 
and were even responsible for some of the insecurity themselves. Meanwhile, the 
IAF had become an important dissuasive presence for any attempted uprisings or 
rebellions. Nevertheless, this was not its original mission. This confusion, coupled 
with severe financial problems relating to Western and Zairian support would, in the 
following months, lead its member governments to push for an early withdrawal.132  
This move partly resulted from the situation of the troops of the various 
contingents on the ground. From the beginning of the deployment itself, questions 
over the nature of financing and logistical support remained unresolved. In early July, 
a delegation from the Moroccan defense ministry visited Paris in an attempt to 
address some of these problems. The Moroccans insisted that French diplomats 
should pressure their other Western partners to ensure that the IAF would be fully 
equipped and financed.133 Indeed, the units suffered from a lack of both serviceable 
vehicles and spare parts. The Moroccan delegation made it clear to French defense 
officials that since the IAF was a French initiative, France should take charge of 
solving these problems.134  
Colonel Gras, on the other hand, felt that IAF complaints were largely unjustified. 
According to Gras, French instructors could successfully train the full Zairian 
airborne brigade of some 3,000 men by May 1979, but only if the resources 
requested by the French Military Mission were provided. However, the difference in 
resources allocated to the IAF relative to those provided to the French training 
mission was “disproportionately” large. Gras suggested that, “Such a policy risks 
extending the stay of the IAF.”135 The Belgians had not even started their training 
mission yet, which aimed to prepare a Zairian infantry brigade within the same 
timeframe.136   
The lack of effective coordination between Zaire’s Western backers contributed 
to the problems of resource allocation and funding for the IAF and the FAZ training 
programs. In early August, Yves Vercauteren, the Belgian chargé d’affaires in Paris 
complained about the lack of cooperation between the “Western Five.” In a 
discussion with French military officials and diplomats, he noted that the interested 
powers had not created a coordination mechanism during their June meeting. 
Consequently, France was supposed to direct requests of the various African 
                                            
132 MAE Nantes Kinshasa Ambassade, Carton 51, Dossier Force I. Africaine et aide militaire, 
Telegram from Ross to Paris, “Eventualité d’un retrait du contingent marocain,” 29.11.1978, p. 2. 
133 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 24, 24/1, Note du ministre de la défense 
à Monsieur le Président de la République, 13.07.1978, p. 1. 
134 Ibid. 
135 MAE La Courneuve, DAM Zaïre 1975–1978, Carton 24, 24/1, Note from Gras to Paris, 
“Fiche sur la relève de la force interafricaine,” 26.08.1978, p. 1. 
136 Ibid., p. 2. 
Saving Mobutu: Zaire, the West, and the Inter-African Force, 1978–1979     29 
 
contingents in Shaba to participating Western governments. However, either France 
had failed in this role, or participating African states did not use France as a unique 
interlocutor since they made financial and logistical requests to various state parties 
on a bilateral basis. Vercauteren wondered if this resulted from a misunderstanding 
over France’s role, and suggested, on behalf of his government, that the Western 
states hold a new meeting to iron out this question, as well as to discuss the broader 
issue of the IAF’s future.137   
In this vein, in September 1978 French, American, German, British, and Belgian 
officials agreed to a meeting in Paris to evaluate Zaire’s situation in the four months 
following Kolwezi. French officials wanted to give the Zairian government 
responsibility for coordinating assistance requests to the five powers, rather than 
themselves playing this role. 138  Regardless, the meeting, held in secret on 
September 18, determined that all material requests would occur bilaterally, and that 
the five Western countries would exchange information through normal diplomatic 
channels.139 Though less efficient, this allowed countries like the United States to 
avoid making a stronger commitment to the IAF through a more formal coordination 
mechanism.  
In an October report to Ambassador André Ross, the French military attaché in 
Kinshasa, Colonel Larzul, noted that so far the IAF had succeeded in its mission. He 
waxed poetic that the IAF deployment had, “brought together, for the first time in 
post-independence African history, Moroccan units and black units, of different races, 
ethnicities, and mentalities, serving together in the same brotherhood of arms.”140 
Nevertheless, serious problems loomed on the horizon.  
The contributing countries would soon need to relieve their troops in one way or 
another. As other observers had noted, no existing unit of the FAZ could relieve any 
IAF unit. According to Larzul, “All of the information that reaches us from Shaba not 
only highlights the FAZ units’ zero value …, but also their negative side (theft, pillage, 
etc.). It would be better in Shaba if the FAZ only existed to protect zones …which 
have secondary strategic importance.”141 Unfortunately, according to Larzul, the 
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FAZ would not have any operational units prepared before the summer of the 
following year.142 
This state of unreadiness distressed officials from participating African countries. 
Togolese leader Gnassingbé Eyadéma complained to French Ambassador Bertrand 
Desmazières that the FAZ example might have “pernicious” effects on his own 
troops. This encouraged him to envisage soon withdrawing the small Togolese 
contingent.143 Furthermore, contrary to Larzul’s panegyrics, serious tensions marred 
relations between the different IAF units, particularly between Moroccan forces and 
the rest.  
Colonel Larzul noted that the Moroccan troops in Lubumbashi had become well 
integrated within the expatriate European community. Local expatriate organizations, 
clubs, and families frequently invited Moroccan officers to their events and homes. 
The Moroccans conducted a number of effective reconnaissance operations towards 
the Zambian frontier, and even crossed it on occasion. Generally, their presence 
seemed to inspire confidence among the Europeans. At the same time though, 
these same officers and men had virtually no contact with the local Zairian 
population who apparently feared them.144  
In mid-October, Colonel N’doye of the Senegalese army contingent and 
commander of the Kolwezi garrison visited Larzul and Gras in Kinshasa, the latter 
being an old friend. There, he harshly criticized the conduct of the Moroccans, 
particularly Colonel-Major Loubaris. According to N’doye, the Moroccan troops 
nominally under his command in Kolwezi refused to follow his orders. His vehicles 
lacked spare parts and Loubaris refused to help him with resupply. While, in 
N’doye’s view, his Senegalese unit had become close to and well integrated within 
Kolwezi’s Zairian population, the Moroccans remained apart. He felt completely 
powerless and blamed Loubaris for his troubles. N’doye made it clear that he would 
report his frustration to military authorities in Dakar. Larzul concluded, “A competent 
officer, Colonel N’doye is dynamic and perfectly able to fulfill his mission, but suffers 
from his dependence on the Moroccan headquarters.”145  
Problems within the IAF chain of command percolated down to the rank and file. 
A later report from the Ivoirian medical unit on the state of morale among the IAF 
troops highlighted the necessity of relief. The report requested that their home 
governments do more to look after their soldiers, noting, “If ‘dignity’ and ‘respect for 
others’ still characterizes our mission, it remains equally true that we continually 
experience a great number of difficulties, difficulties which deeply affect the morale 
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of the men.”146 The report explained that many of their vehicles no longer functioned 
and the mission lacked tarpaulins to waterproof crucial supplies. 147  Despite 
explaining this situation several times before, no one had done anything about it. 
Furthermore, the price increases resulting from the devaluation of the Zaire had a 
direct impact on the soldiers’ standards of living. This collection of problems 
obviously translated into a worsening morale. The report noted increasing incidents 
of indiscipline, nervous breakdowns, and, in the Moroccan contingent, even 
suicides.148 
These deteriorating conditions may have contributed to the rumors that 
Moroccan officers began to spread about the imminent departure of their force in 
October 1978. Such declarations sowed panic among Shaba’s expatriate population, 
who still very much feared the consequences of an IAF withdrawal.149 André Ross 
shared these fears. In a late November handwritten note to René Journiac, he noted 
that the Moroccans had declared that they intended to leave Shaba at the end of the 
year. He also referred to rumors that the Senegalese had made similar moves. He 
felt that these might be bluffs on the part of the two countries in order to obtain more 
financial support from the West. Nonetheless, a Moroccan retreat would have “most 
serious” consequences for Zaire. Furthermore, French and Belgian efforts at 
retraining FAZ units had suffered significant delays. Also, Angola had apparently 
failed to disarm all the Katangan Gendarmes, as a dissident faction of the latter 
remained near the frontier. Ross urged Journiac to do everything possible to keep 
the Moroccans in Shaba until at least the middle of the following year.150   
In a meeting with his French, Belgian, and British colleagues in Kinshasa, 
American Ambassador Walter Cutler noted that the Moroccans probably had 
multiple reasons to leave. Apart from financial issues, the most important reason 
related to the fact that "after the reconciliation between Kinshasa and Luanda, this 
force no longer had the task of preventing outside aggression, but of maintaining 
order,” in Shaba.151 
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Alarmed by the possibility of the IAF’s collapse, and at the request of Belgium’s 
foreign minister, Henri Simonet, France reconvened a meeting of Zaire’s major 
Western partners on December 13, 1978. French foreign ministry officials worried 
that without quick Western action, the withdrawal of the IAF would “plunge the 
country into insecurity” and cause the remaining 7,000 European expatriates in 
Shaba to leave. This would probably incapacitate the province’s mines and thus 
compromise the regime’s recovery.152   
The representatives from the four other Western powers present at the meeting 
agreed with this analysis. Furthermore, they agreed that the IAF should continue to 
operate until at least mid-1979 when the first capable FAZ units would theoretically 
become operational. Thus it became urgent that the Western Five begin negotiations 
with Senegal and Morocco in order to convince them to maintain their 
deployments.153  
As matters stood though, no one, apart from Belgian officials, seemed 
particularly interested in augmenting their financial commitments to the mission.154 
British diplomats insisted that their aid to neighboring Zambia already contributed to 
stability in Shaba. While they considered providing some bilateral aid to Morocco 
and Senegal to offset the costs of the deployment, they feared that high levels of 
overt assistance would incur high political costs on the IAF’s Western backers. 
British policymakers, at least, did not seem willing risk their political standing in 
Africa by significantly committing to the mission.155  
At the same time, French officials found American reluctance particularly galling. 
Indeed, American officials found an interesting and relatively cost-free method of 
prolonging the IAF’s deployment. As Senegal and Morocco made repeated requests 
for their troops’ repatriation, the American administration simply refused to comply. 
The Americans considered these requests “inopportune” and wanted the troops to 
stay for fear of a power vacuum.156 This left the troops stranded in Shaba for neither 
country had the transport capacity to extract them.  
This also had much to do with American desires to place as much responsibility 
for the Shaba operation on African states themselves, and on their French and 
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Belgian backers. 157  One of the reasons for this was financial. The Carter 
administration worked under rather stringent budgetary restraints, which limited the 
amount of assistance it could provide for the IAF.158  Bilateral foreign military aid 
could not go to states without specific earmarks for this kind of assistance.159 In any 
case, the United States had already spent 13 million dollars on their contribution to 
the airlift during Shaba II and had granted 11 million dollars of Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) credits to Zaire in 1978. American officials emphasized that Mobutu could use 
this to support the IAF.160  
Another reason for American reticence lay in their perception of Mobutu as a 
possibly hopeless case. Despite Mobutu’s reconciliation with Neto, the State 
Department reported that “Shabans returning from Angola under Mobutu’s amnesty 
are being arrested, and the necessary measures have not been taken to achieve 
military reform … Meanwhile, Mobutu’s army in Shaba continues to exhibit an almost 
total lack of discipline.”161 American officials also felt that the pressure they put on 
the “Western Five,” Zaire, and IAF-participating countries, had more or less paid off. 
They noted that the French had begun negotiating with Senegal over its financial 
and logistical needs, and that Mobutu had put a C-130 transport aircraft at the 
disposal of the mission. 162 Furthermore, French officials had also managed to 
convince the West German government to finance one fifth of the operational 
costs163 and the Belgian government agreed to provide more assistance.164   
French diplomats had indeed worked out a deal with the Senegalese 
government. In exchange for five million dollars’ worth of military equipment for 
Senegalese army units in Dakar, Senegal, agreed to postpone its request for 
repatriation.165 Morocco, on the other hand, posed more problems. French officials 
tried to convince King Hassan that he could use subsidies he received from Kuwait 
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and Saudi Arabia to help finance the IAF mission. He replied that these funds went 
to the Moroccan military in general, and not the IAF. Hassan may also have intended 
to use a Moroccan withdrawal as blackmail in order to get more Western diplomatic 
support for his operations in the Western Sahara.166 Although Western pressure led 
him to grudgingly agree to prolong his force’s presence in Shaba, the threat of 
Moroccan withdrawal weighed heavily on the mission over the next months.167  
This only delayed the inevitable. Rapidly deployed without a specific mandate, 
nor an appropriate finance mechanism, the IAF could only serve as a temporary 
measure while Zaire and its allies worked out a more sustainable security strategy. 
By March 1979, the Moroccans made it clear that they planned to leave. After an 
absence of several weeks, Colonel-Major Loubaris, returned to Shaba and called a 
meeting of all the IAF contingent commanders. He handed each of them a letter, 
addressed to their respective heads of state from King Hassan II. The letter 
explained that, in Morocco’s view, Shaba was secure, and the FAZ ready to take the 
place of the IAF. He no longer saw a reason for the continued presence of the 
mission in Zaire.168 Hassan had also sent a letter to Mobutu announcing his decision, 
and asking for Mobutu’s permission to withdrawal.169  
Mobutu negotiated an agreement with Morocco and the other contingents. The 
IAF would conduct a phased withdrawal over a three-month period from July to 
September 1979.170 The newly trained FAZ infantry units would gradually replace 
the peacekeepers as they left. The Belgians, at least, thought that their training 
efforts of the FAZ 21st Infantry Brigade had largely succeeded. Belgian observers 
monitoring its deployment in Shaba in September 1979 noted that, “the population 
appreciates the presence of the 21st Brigade, whose men are behaving correctly,” 
unlike other FAZ units in the province. Even the expatriate community felt 
confidence in them, as Belgian officers accompanied its units.171  
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Nonetheless, French officials still worried that the withdrawal of the IAF could 
cause an unacceptable political and military vacuum in the region.172 Thus, they 
began to look for a way to again reassure the European expatriate population, and 
provide some deterrent element to Shaba security that could bolster the presence of 
the newly trained, though untried, FAZ units.  
As the IAF withdrew, French officers began to work out details of a joint Franco-
Zairian military exercise to take place in Shaba shortly after the last IAF units had 
departed. Colonel Larzul, explained that this exercise: 
will only have a deterrent effect on the rebel elements still existing in 
Shaba if it is planned and implemented with rigor, accuracy, and 
speed; that’s the goal in certain Franco-African joint-exercises when 
the enemy is imaginary. Here, French airborne companies will 
maneuver in an operational zone with possible sharp reactions from an 
enemy whose strength is difficult to evaluate but is present in the 
towns and capable of launching guerilla actions.173 
This joint exercise, named “Opération Porc-épic” (Operation Porcupine), was to 
complement the deployment of the new Zairian units and serve as a warning to 
future interlopers that France could intervene again if necessary.174 Although it only 
involved a relatively small number of French troops, it also meant to demonstrate 
French capacities to project force and provide security.175 
The French consul general in Lubumbashi, Pierre Guth, noted the effect that the 
“Porc-Epic” exercise had on the local population. He asserted: “Opinion is 
unanimous: by participating in these maneuvers, our government has confirmed its 
absolute support for President Mobutu and his regime. It was demonstrated that, in 
case of need, France would intervene like it did in 1977 and 1978.”176  
However, analyzing more closely the impact of these maneuvers, Guth made 
the point that one had to separate expatriate opinion from the Zairians. While 
European expatriates felt reassured by this demonstration of force, the Zairian 
response substantially differed. According to Guth, “For the Zairians, except for party 
activists, all deplore our support. For them, the action of our country, whatever its 
form, can only consolidate a regime which, in their opinion, causes misery for the 
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people.”177 Indeed, some of the local population had suffered such trauma in the 
previous months and years that the “Porc-Epic” exercise itself scared communities 
living along the Zambian frontier into fleeing their villages.178  
African Diplomacy 
While the IAF represented the first all-African peacekeeping operation, its existence 
exacerbated serious political divisions on the continent. The years 1977–1979 were 
a time of increased external military interventionism in Africa. The high levels of 
French and Cuban soldiers and “advisors,” as well as a large Soviet presence, 
ensured that the question of outside intervention lay at the core of debates at the 
OAU Summit in Khartoum in mid-July 1978. However, it was the French and Belgian 
interventions in Kolwezi and subsequent efforts behind the IAF that provoked the 
most concerns.179   
Several years later, Nigerian scholar Olajide Aluko lamented that, “one can see 
that the effects of African response to external intervention in Africa have been 
insignificant. External interventions in the affairs of the continent have continued.”180 
The historical record, though, does not completely bear out this pessimism. Although 
the OAU could develop little in the way of a concrete African response to foreign 
military interventionism, it did serve as a powerful tool for delegitimizing wider 
French designs to create a Pan-African security force outside of the OAU framework.  
As early as the April 1977 Franco-African Summit held in Dakar, several 
“moderate” African states closely tied to France, raised the question of receiving 
French support for the creation of an Inter-African military force composed of 
francophone countries.181 This suggestion, coming at the height of the first Shaba 
crisis, responded to increasing fears of foreign, particularly communist, 
interventionism. Giscard declared that, “All African states have a right to security 
inside their frontiers, whatever their political orientation.”182  
 Within days of the Kolwezi events, Paris hosted the Fifth Franco-African Summit. 
Clearly, security and the threats of external intervention lay at the heart of the 
Summit’s discussions. At this same Summit where France and Zaire managed to 
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cobble together the IAF, Giscard, without a hint of irony, solemnly declared, “We 
must refuse to let the politics of the blocs ravage Africa.”183  Togolese leader, 
Gnassingbé Eyadéma went even further and denounced, “the blind violence, the 
brutal interference of foreign powers in the affairs of sovereign countries”184 Omar 
Bongo, the president of Gabon, suggested the creation of a common military 
assistance pact.185  
French officials, enthusiastic about this idea, wanted American support for the 
initiative. They brought up the idea of a Pan-African Force with several American 
diplomats shortly after the Summit meeting. However, undersecretary of state for 
political affairs, David Newsom, in Paris for consultations on the IAF, had 
instructions to “pour cold water on the idea.”186 The Americans had no desire to get 
involved in an initiative that sounded like another appendage to French 
neocolonialism. 
In a statement sent to a number of francophone African capitals, the Carter 
administration outlined its position on the issue of the Pan-African Force:  
As we have told our Congress and stated publicly, our support of 
African forces is limited to the immediate crisis situation in Shaba, and 
we have no thought of support for an African mutual defense force. 
Any wider involvement by us would require high level policy decisions 
and close consultations with our African and European friends, as well 
as with the American Congress.187 
Regardless of American desires to distance themselves from French initiatives, the 
deployment of the IAF in Zaire served clear Western interests and saved Mobutu’s 
crumbling authoritarian regime. This provoked significant divisions among African 
countries.  
It infuriated Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. On June 1, 1978, he 
summoned the American chargé d’affaires. He had also summoned the UK high 
commissioner and the West German ambassador the previous day. The American 
Embassy reported that Nyerere, “would have great suspicions about a Western-
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backed force in Shaba, especially if [the] French [were] involved …. Nyerere wanted 
to warn us off altogether and would regard Western-backed military presence in 
Shaba as a dangerous first step in collaborating with France in what he would 
consider the military re-colonization of Africa.” Although Nyerere supported the idea 
of territorial integrity, his concern seemed “overshadowed in this case by his concern 
that Western intervention to prop up Mobutu’s regime (which he sees as hopelessly 
corrupt) would be a giant step backward for the African revolution.”188  
Other African leaders had serious suspicions of French motives. Nigerian 
policymakers, who often saw France as a competitor for influence, denounced 
Western intervention in Zaire. At the same time, their own experience of civil war 
and southeastern Nigeria’s attempted secession (supported by France) in the 
Biafran conflict ensured that Nigerian officials were conscious of dangers to territorial 
integrity, a concept enshrined in the Charter of the OAU. Thus, Nigerian leaders also 
attacked the Cuban and Soviet presence in Africa. President Olusegun Obasanjo, 
attacked the West and the East in equal measure: 
The Soviets should, therefore, see it to be in their interest not to seek 
to perpetually maintain their presence in Africa, even after the purpose 
for which they were invited has been achieved. This way they run the 
risk of being dubbed a new imperial power as indeed they are already 
being called, even by those with whom they have had long association. 
Let the Soviets and their collaborators heed this timely counsel. To the 
Western powers I say […] Paratroop drops in the twentieth century are 
no more acceptable to us than the gunboats of the last century were to 
our ancestors. Convening conferences in Europe and America to 
decide the fate of Africa raises too many ugly specters which should 
best be forgotten, both in our and in the Europeans’ interests.189  
Ultimately the Nigerian and Tanzanian positions prevailed in the OAU conference’s 
final resolution on the question of the Inter-African Force as drafted by the Council of 
Ministers. The “Resolution on the Inter-African Military Force of Intervention,” 
specifically attacked the French and Francophone states’ proposal to establish a 
Pan-African military force outside of the authority of the OAU. The resolution: 
1. Affirms that Africa’s defense and security are the exclusive 
responsibility of the Africans;  
2. Solemnly declares that the creation of an Inter-African force can be 
envisaged only within the context of the OAU’s objectives and priorities 
for the elimination of the racist minority regimes of Southern Africa, the 
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total liberation of the continent, and the safeguarding of the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States. 
3. Calls for the reactivation of the OAU Defense Commission to 
consider the desirability of establishing an Inter-African Military Force 
under the aegis of the OAU.190  
This clear position of the OAU against any external Pan-African defense force 
helped to “pour cold water” over the idea. Countries originally interested in the idea 
of a Francophone security force suddenly became more hesitant. Before a meeting 
of the OAU’s newly reactivated Defense Commission in April 1979, the Rwandan 
foreign ministry recommended prudence to its delegation due to “the bitterness and 
[…] general disapproval that the initiative to create a heterogeneous security force of 
foreign emanation had provoked.”191 Indeed, the OAU had laid an obstacle in the 
path of French efforts to circumvent it.  
This became clearer during the proceedings of the 6th annual Franco-African 
Summit held in Kigali, Rwanda. During the preparatory ministerial meeting in late 
April 1979, the question of African security provoked a heated debate among the 
delegates. Several delegates representing some of the more “radical” states such as 
Benin, Congo, and Mali, opposed the idea of placing the question of African security 
on the Summit’s agenda. According to them, the Franco-African Summit was not the 
appropriate body to debate these issues since the OAU had created its own 
commission to address security issues.192 Also, they argued that the sensitive 
nature of the question would undermine African unity and would divide the Summit 
meeting.193  
During the Franco-African Summit the following month, the French and African 
heads of state only briefly discussed the matter. Senegalese President Senghor 
noted that the OAU suffered from too many ideological divisions for a Pan-African 
force to become practical or effective. Thus, Senghor concluded, Africans should 
abandon the idea of such a force and instead rely upon “security solidarity.” After a 
brief discussion, the summit decided to highlight, “the need for security for the 
economic development of African countries. This should be ensured within the 
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framework of bilateral solidarities.”194 The Francophone Pan-African force had died, 
but “bilateral solidarity” could only mean one thing: reliance upon France. The legacy 
of this “solidarity” has persisted over the decades.  
Conclusion 
Western security priorities in Zaire, as elsewhere in Africa, focused on the need for 
“stability” against threats of communist expansion. This policy, though, depended 
largely on local actors. At the same time, the particular interests of these actors, 
Mobutu foremost among them, also undercut the long-term viability of externally 
backed stabilization policies. Ironically, while Western policymakers struggled to 
control their “proxies,” they assumed that local communist “proxies,” such as the 
Tigres or the Angolan government, had no agency of their own and were simple 
pawns in a larger chess game played by their Soviet or Cuban masters.  
Indeed, American and French policymakers made much out of alleged Cuban 
efforts to arm, organize, and even lead the Katangan operations in Shaba. This even 
became the centerpiece of Carter administration justifications for their role in 
supporting the French and Belgian interventions. One should note, though, that 
more recent scholarship based on work with Cuban sources has largely debunked 
these assertions. 195  The CIA based its claims on circumstantial evidence. 
Meanwhile French officials, whose accusations of Cuban involvement went far 
beyond those of their American counterparts, derived their most important 
intelligence from Zairian government and military sources. In short, the available 
evidence suggests that the very basis of Western fears rested on a combination of 
distorted ideological assumptions and locally manipulated “intelligence.” 196  This 
observation leads to the broader theme of this paper, which emphasizes that local 
agency is important in understanding the ultimate nature, impact, and efficacy of 
Western policies. 
The IAF deployment provoked serious tensions among African capitals and 
within the OAU. France played the lead organizing role, the United States provided 
significant logistical support, and Belgium, Britain, and West Germany helped to 
finance the endeavor. This meant that the IAF looked a lot like a Western proxy 
operation to many African observers. Parallel French efforts to establish a 
permanent African rapid reaction force intensified these suspicions and helped to 
sharpen political divisions already present in the OAU. Even American policymakers 
rejected such propositions, out of the fear of becoming a prop to French 
neocolonialism.  
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OCAM, Sommet régionale de l’Afrique Centrale et Orientale 1979–1991, VIe Conférence Franco-
Africaine, Sommet, Kigali, 21–22 Mai 1979, “Rapport sur les travaux du sommet,” p. 8. 
195 See Piero Gleijeses, “Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter, and the Invasions of Shaba,” The 
International History Review 18, 1, pp. 70-103. (1996). 
196 See long discussion in Powell, “The Cuba of the West?” 
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At the same time, despite the material and political difficulties, the IAF 
deployment did help provide the breathing space needed for Western assistance 
and regional diplomatic efforts to achieve their short-term goals. In the face of 
economic weakness, regime corruption, and a lack of clearly defined and functional 
state institutions, Mobutu benefited from sufficient aid injections to ensure his 
political survival and continued access to international financial markets. Additionally, 
following the IAF withdrawal, French policymakers practically offered Mobutu an 
extended security umbrella, signaled through a series of military exercises aimed at 
communicating strong Franco-Zairian ties.  
Ultimately though, Western obsessions with “stability” and intense paranoia of 
communist expansion fed policies that strengthened a dangerously corrupt and 
destructive dictatorship. Their actions and those of their European and African allies 
ensured their immediate collective security, at least as they perceived it. However, 
such short term and narrowly conceived objectives enabled a poisonous political and 
economic climate to persist, buying ephemeral stability at the price of enabling 
practices that led to long-term catastrophe. 
The mutual attempts by Western governments and their African interlocutors to 
cajole and influence the policies of one another highlights an interesting aspect of 
their relationship. By making themselves indispensable to broader Western, and 
particularly French security interests, states like Morocco and Senegal could extract 
certain concessions and influence policies. African states also managed to sabotage 
French efforts at building a regional security architecture by attacking its legitimacy 
and making it difficult for even the most sympathetic of France’s African allies to sign 
on to the project. Mobutu himself also effectively used his position as a necessary 
pillar of Western security policy to ensure that he could avoid making the kinds of 
substantial reforms demanded of him, while reaping the benefits of protection and 
aid. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski’s military assistant in the National Security Council, 
Brigadier General William Odom, harshly criticized multinational efforts at reforming 
Zaire. For Odom, the efforts to establish expatriate control over the economy and to 
improve the FAZ seemed both counterproductive and dangerous. He angrily noted 
that, “The traditional name for this was ‘Colonialism.’”197 He thought that the “logical 
contradictions” in what the West was trying to achieve in Zaire would “condemn 
them to disaster.”198 As Zaire’s subsequent history has shown, Odom may have 
been right.  
 
                                            
197 JCL, Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 28 (Meetings—SCC 
50: 1/9/78 through SCC 100: 8/10/78), Folder (Meetings—SCC 80: 5/26/1978), Document 1D, Memo 
from William Odom to Brzezinski and Aaron, “State Paper on ‘Zaire: Options After Shaba II,’” 
25.05.1978, p. 1. 
198 Ibid., p. 2. 
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